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THE GUATEMALA PROTOCOL TO THE
WARSAW CONVENTION
ROBERT P. BOYLE*
Since 1934, the United States has been party to the Conven-
tion for the Unification of Certain Rules relating to International
Transportation by Air, usually referred to as the Warsaw Conven-
tion.' The Convention was opened for signature at a Diplomatic
Conference held in Warsaw, Poland, in 1929, and came into effect
in 1933. Its major purpose was to establish a regime of law which
would give needed stability and uniformity to what was in 1929, an
infant international air transport industry. To this end, the Conven-
tion established uniform rules on such things as documentation
(passenger tickets and airway bills of lading), procedural rules
governing the time and place for filing damage claims, and the
basis for and limits of liability. Of the principal provisions of the
Warsaw Convention, those governing the basis for and limits of the
liability of the air carrier to the passenger have proven to be the
most controversial.
This article is not intended to deal with the chequered history
of thirty years of efforts to find a solution to this problem, but only
to examine the latest such attempt-The Guatemala Protocol.'
Earlier commentators and scholars3 have learnedly and exhaus-
* A.B. Williams College, LL.B. Harvard. Consultant to the Federal Avia-
tion Administration on international aviation affairs, serving as Chairman of the
Interagency Group on International Aviation's Ad Hoc Committee on Warsaw/
Guatemala. Member of United States Delegations to Diplomatic Conferences on
Air Law at The Hague (1955), and Guatemala (1971). Signed the Guatemala
Convention on behalf of the United States, pursuant to a "full power." The views
expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily rep-
resent the views of any government agency with which he is now or has been
associated.
1. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Interna-
tional Transportation by Air, done at Warsaw Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000
(1929) [hereinafter cited as Warsaw Convention].
2. Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules
Relating to International Carriage by Air Signed at Warsaw on 12 October 1929
as Amended by the Protocol Done at the Hague on 28 September 1955, done at
Guatemala City March 8, 1971 [reproduced in 10 INT'L LEGAL MATERALS 613
(1971)] [hereinafter cited as Guatemala Protocol].
3. For a complete review and analysis of the events leading up to the begin-
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tively covered the tortuous path that led to the Guatemala Protocol,
and no further commentary beyond that necessary to set the stage
would be appropriate.
I. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The United States historically has been the prime mover in
seeking revision of those parts of the Warsaw Convention that deal
with the limit of liability of the air carrier.4 In fact, active work on
this aspect of revision of the Warsaw Convention within the Inter-
national Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) began as long as
thirty years ago, soon after the end of World War I. 5 The United
States' preoccupation with the amount of the liability limit over this
span of time is not an indication that it considered nothing else to
be wrong with the Warsaw Convention. It is simply a reflection of
the fact that in terms of recoveries by victims of aviation accidents
in domestic air transportation within the United States where no
limit existed, recoveries by U.S. citizens in international accidents
where limited by the Warsaw Convention were considered to be far
too low. Thus, the limit was the most dramatic of the defects in the
Warsaw Convention and, as such, received the most attention.
However, the limit could not be divorced from the related elements
of the treaty; it was, in fact, a part of an integrated system. For
example, under the Convention, the air carrier could escape liabili-
ty if it could establish that it had "taken all necessary measures to
avoid the damage or that it was impossible . . . to take such
measures." On the other hand, the air carrier could not avail itself
of this limit of liability "if the damage is caused by his wilful
misconduct or by such default on his part as, in accordance with
the law of the court to which the case is submitted, is considered to
be equivalent to wilful misconduct."
7
ning of work on the Guatemala Protocol including a collection of all major writ-
ings on the subject, see Lowenfeld and Mendelson, The United States and the
Warsaw Convention, 80 HLv. L. REV. 497 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Lowen-
feld].
4. Testimony of Leonard Meeker, Legal Adviser, Department of State, on
ratification of the Hague Protocol to the Warsaw Convention before the Commit-
tee on Foreign Relations, S. ExEc. H., 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1959) [hereinafter
cited as Meeker].
5. ICAO Doc. 7686-LC/140 (1947) at XV.
6. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 20.
7. Id., art. 25. This is the "official" translation of the French in which
the Warsaw Convention was written. 49 Stat. 3000, 3020 (1934). The phrase
"wilful misconduct" is a translation of the French word "dol"; see the French text
Vol. 6
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Thus, on the one hand, the claimant under the Warsaw Con-
vention has the advantage of a presumption of fault by the air
carrier which the carrier must rebut if it is to escape liability, but
on the other, the carrier has the advantage of a limit on its liability
unless the claimant, by affirmative proof, establishes "wilful mis-
conduct." For the past thirty years, the interrelation of these fac-
tors has been the focal point of negotiations seeking some resolu-
tion of the Warsaw Convention problem.
The limit of liability of the original Convention was expressed
in article 22 as 125,000 francs, defined as a "French franc con-
sisting of 65% milligrams of gold at the standard of fineness of
nine hundred thousandths." This converted in round figures to
8,300 U.S. dollars so long as the official price for gold in the
United States was $35 per ounce. Although there have been recent
changes in the official price for gold in the United States with major
consequences to be discussed later, the $8,300 figure was the
basic amount around which negotiations centered.8
A. The Hague Protocol
The first effort to modify the Warsaw Convention by increas-
ing the limit and making some attempts at modernization to take
account of the rapidly evolving air transport industry's new methods
of operation was the Hague Protocol of 1955.1 This Protocol was
the end result of more than ten years of negotiations in the Legal
Committee of ICAO, and it provided for a doubling of the limit of
liability to $16,600. In addition to such limit, it also authorized,
but did not require, courts to award all costs of litigation including
attorneys fees, absent a timely and adequate offer of settlement.' °
at 49 Stat. 3006 (1934). Just what type of conduct could be considered "wilful
misconduct" or "dol" has been a subject on which there has been little agreement,
particularly in U.S. courts; compare Gray v. American Airlines, 227 F.2d 282 (2d
Cir. 1955), with Goepp v. American Overseas Airlines, [1951] U.S. Av. 527 (Sup.
Ct., N.Y. Co., N.Y.). See generally Hjalsted, The Air Carrier's Liability in Cases
of Unknown Cause of Damage in International Law, 27 J. Am L. 86 (1960)
[hereinafter cited as Hjalsted].
8. By Order dated January 3, 1974, in Docket 26274, the Civil Aeronautics
Board required certain air carriers to revise liability limitations arising under the
Warsaw Convention to $10,000 reflecting the change in the U.S. official price of
gold to $42.22 per ounce. 39 Fed. Reg. 1526 (1974).
9. Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules
relating to International Carriage by Air Signed at Warsaw on 12 October 1929,
done at the Hague Sept. 28, 1955, 478 U.N.T.S. 371 [hereinafter cited as Hague
Protocol].
10. Id., art. XI.
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Further, in an effort to end disparate treatment of "wilful miscon-
duct" in courts within the United States and abroad, article 25 of
the Warsaw Convention was amended to provide that the limit
would not apply if the damage resulted from an act or omission
"done with intent to cause damage or recklessly and with knowledge
that damage would probably result. . . .""' Possibly there was for
some countries an element of trade-off in this latter change. The
more difficult it was to "break" the liability limit, the higher it was
possible to set that limit, and some countries accepted the higher
limit because in their view the new standard would be more
difficult to break. However, it is doubtful that this trade-off was the
principal motivation for the majority since not all courts had been
persuaded to "expansive interpretations of wilful misconduct,"
even though apparently most did have some problems of interpre-
tation and even-handed application.' 2 In any event, the new limit
and the new standard by which it could be broken, together with
the other improvements, persuaded the United States to recom-
mend ratification of the Hague Protocol.' 3
For a variety of reasons the United States delayed action on
ratifying the Hague Protocol. 4 It was not until July, 1959, that the
Hague Protocol was transmitted to the Senate for ratification, and
it was not until May of 1965 that hearings on the question of
ratification began.' 5 Thus, the hearings on ratification occurred ten
years after the Diplomatic Conference which opened the document
for signature by States. The net result of this ten year delay was
that the new limit of liability of $16,600, plus costs of litigation in
some cases contained in the Hague Protocol were no longer enough
to provide adequate recovery for U.S. victims of international air
accidents.' 6
In renewing its request for ratification, the executive branch
proposed the adoption of legislation which would provide an addi-
tional $50,000 of insurance for all international passengers subject
to the Warsaw Convention whose journey originated or terminated
11. Id., art. XIII; see also Meeker, supra note 4, at 4.
12. See Hjalsted, supra note 7, at 122.
13. Meeker, note 4, supra.
14. For discussion of these reasons, see Lowenfeld, note 3, supra.
15. Meeker, note 4, supra.
16. Statements of Leonard Meeker and Najeeb Halaby, in Hearings before
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in the United States.17 If adopted, the legislatively provided insur-
ance, coupled with the Hague limit, would produce a total potential
recovery of $66,600 which compared favorably with the data
available at that time on the average recoveries in domestic aviation
accident cases where the Warsaw Convention would not operate to
limit recoveries. 8 After extensive hearings, the Committee on For-
eign Relations of the U.S. Senate agreed with the position taken by
the executive branch and gave its advice and consent to ratification
of the Hague Protocol, but only on condition that the accompany-
ing insurance legislation be adopted prior to the adjournment of
the 89th Congress. 19
The legislation proved extremely unpopular. In fact, no hear-
ings were ever held on the proposal. Although it is difficult to point
to a single reason for this, it is fair to say that the most signficant
opposition came from the U.S. airlines, and certainly such opposi-
tion was a major factor in the demise of the legislative insurance
supplement.2" Whatever the reason, the failure of the legislation
ended what small hope there had been to secure ratification of the
Hague Protocol, with the result that the United States was left with
the unamended Warsaw Convention and its now hopelessly outdat-
ed limit of liability.
B. Efforts to Avoid United States Denunciation of the Warsaw
Convention
As it became clear that the supplemental legislation and the
Hague Protocol were lost causes in the Congress, unsuccessful ef-
forts were made to seek other solutions to the low limits of the un-
amended Warsaw Convention, primarily through a voluntary agree-
ment by international airlines to a higher limit of liability. 21 Hav-
ing exhausted every feasible alternative, the executive branch finally
concluded that it could no longer subject the American air traveller
to a limit of $8,300, and on November 15, 1965, filed notice of
denunciation of the Warsaw Convention, which under the terms of
the Convention would be effective in six months.22 This notice was
17. Id.
18. Id.; see tables at 28-37.
19. Report from the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, S. EXEC.
H., 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1959).
20. Id. at 53.
21. For a discussion of this area, see Lowenfeld, supra note 3.
22. 50 DEP'T STATE BULL. 923 (1965).
1975
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coupled with a statement that the denunciation would be withdrawn
if there was "reasonable prospect" of international agreement to a
limit "in the area of $100,000." A further condition was that until
such agreement could become effective, there would have to be
enacted a "provisional arrangement among the principal interna-
tional airlines" waiving the limit up to $75,000.23 This statement
was issued because ICAO, seeing the failure of the United States
attempt to find a way to remain in the Warsaw Convention system,
had belatedly issued a call for a special meeting to begin on Febru-
ary 1, 1966 to seek a solution.
24
This special meeting was literally a last minute effort by the
international aviation community to stave off U.S. denunciation of
the Warsaw Convention. It was convened in a confused and some-
what hostile atmosphere due largely to a feeling that the United
States was in effect coercing the international aviation community
by its denunciation. 25 The meeting consisted of negotiations be-
tween the United States and the rest of the nations present on the
issue of what should be the limit of liability in the Warsaw system.
The United States opened with the proposal that this be set at
$100,000, and later elaborated on this to specify that this limit
would be inclusive of legal fees.26 This in turn was met by a
number of comments and counter proposals from other govern-
ments. After a great deal of discussion, these several counter
proposals were finally reduced to four upon which debate and vot-
ing focused.27 However, despite efforts of the delegates attending,
no consensus on a proposal acceptable to the United States could
be achieved, and the meeting ended without recommendation on
the central question concerning an increase to the limit of liability
under the Warsaw Convention.28
There has been some controversy as to whose fault it was that
this special meeting failed. Some lay blame at the door of the
United States.29 Others attribute it, at least in part, to a procedural
problem that unfortunately prevented a vote on a possible compro-
23. Id. at 924.
24. ICAO Doe. 8584-LC/154-1 (1966).
25. Id. See particularly the statement of the French Delegate at 10, the
statement of the Zambian Delegate at 33, and the report of the Secretariat at IX.
26. Id., Statement of U.S. at 5-7 and 30-3 1.
27. Id., Report of Secretariat, paras. 20 and 21, at XI.
28. Id., Statement of U.S., pages 140-42.
29. Id. See particularly the statements of the representatives of the Congo
(Brazzaville) at 148, France, at 150, and Jamaica, at 151.
Vol. 6
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mise solution.80 Whatever may be the real reason (and it probably
lies somewhere between these two views) the Conference ended in
failure and with little prospect that the U.S. denunciation of War-
saw would be withdrawn before it came into effect.8'
At this point the international airlines undertook to seek
a solution that might delay the taking effect of the U.S. with-
drawal from the Warsaw system. The Director General of the
International Air Transport Association (IATA) queried whether
the United States would cancel its notice of denunciation if the
major international airlines serving the United States would agree
to contract for a limit of liability at $75,000, and waive their
defenses under article 20 (1) of the Warsaw Convention.2 He was
advised that if such agreement included all carriers operating to
and from the United States, including the major U.S. airlines, there
was a possibility of such withdrawal." At this point, there began a
frantic effort to round up the international carriers and secure their
agreement to a voluntary special contract for such higher limit of
liability pursuant to article 22 of the Warsaw Convention. The
effort was ultimately successful and the so-called Montreal Agree-
ment came into effect.
34
C. The Montreal Agreement
The Montreal Agreement did two things. First, as already
noted, the air carriers agreed to a liability limit of $75,000, and
waived any defense pursuant to article 20 (1) of the Warsaw
Convention. 5 Secondly, the carriers agreed to furnish a specific
type of notice to the passenger that the Warsaw Convention may
limit the liability of the air carrier. 8 Thus, a start had been made
30. See Lowenfeld, supra note 3, at 574-75.
31. Statement of U.S. Representative, ICAO Doc. 8584-LC/154-1 (1966)
at 141.
32. See remarks of Sir William Hildred, Symposium on the Warsaw Con-
vention, 33 J. Ant L. 519, 525 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Warsaw Symposium].
33. Id.
34. Agreement, C.A.B. 18900, approved C.A.B. Order No. E23680, Docket
17325, May 13, 1966, 44 CAB REP. 819 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Montreal
Agreement]. For details of this effort, see Warsaw Symposium, supra note 32.
35. Montreal Agreement, note 34, supra.
36. This provision was designed to assure that the new limit of $75,000
would not be broken by a court holding that the notice given the passenger was
inadequate, thus invoking the provisions of article 3 of the Warsaw Convention
under which the airline cannot invoke the limit of liability if he fails to deliver
a ticket containing the required notice. See, e.g., Lisi v. Alitalia Airlines, 370
F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1966), aff'd, 390 U.S. 455 (1968).
7
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toward two goals which were developing as basic premises of the
U.S. view of what the Warsaw Convention should be in the future.
The first goal was to establish a limit of liability which provided a
more adequate recovery for the U.S. victims of international avia-
tion accidents. The second was to establish a legal regime under
which most claimants could recover without resort to time-consum-
ing and expensive litigation.
The first of these objectives was clearly and unequivocably
stated by the United States in its position papers filed with ICAO at
the beginning of the special meeting of February, 1966." 7 The
second objective was not fully articulated during the meeting,
although it is foreshadowed by the U.S. agreement to accept a
solution which incorporated the principle of absolute liability.8
However, the U.S. Delegation was somewhat ambiguous on this
point, and possibly due to this fact the Conference failed to recom-
mend a system based on the theory of absolute liability.39 In any
event, important issues arising from adoption of the concept of
absolute liability, such as the nature of defenses left to the carrier,
were left unresolved, and in fact, almost completely undiscussed.
These issues remain unresolved in the Montreal Agreement even
today. However, this omission is probably not as significant as it
would have been in an amendment of the treaty, because in reality
all a carrier has done under the Montreal Agreement is waive the
defense of proving that it has taken all necessary measures to avoid
the damage. Existing defenses under other provisions of the War-
saw Convention are not waived. In fact, there is interesting litiga-
tion on the use of such defenses which points up the fact that in
1966, when the United States was seeking a revision of the Warsaw
Convention, the problem of the defenses to be allowed a carrier
under a regime of absolute liability had not been fully examined.
40
The Montreal Agreement ended the crisis created by the U.S.
denunciation of the Warsaw Convention, but it did not solve the
underlying problem. The Warsaw Convention remained a treaty
drawn up in 1929 to provide a legal framework for the internation-
al operations of an infant air transportation industry. In fact, either
the original Warsaw Convention or that Convention as amended by
37. ICAO Doc. 8584-LC/154-2 (1966) at 174-78.
38. ICAO Doc. 8584-LC/154-1 (1966) at 89, 90.
39. Id. at 95, 196.
40. Kriendler, Recent Developments in Aerial Hijacking: The Issue of
Liability, 6 AKRON L. REV. 157 (1973).
Vol. 6
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the Hague Protocol governed substantially all international air
transportation that did not operate to, from or through the United
States. 4 Thus, U.S. citizens who for one reason or the other were
passengers traveling on tickets not going to, from or through the
United States were still possibly subject to the limits of liability set
forth in the original or amended Warsaw Convention, $8,300 and
$16,600 respectively.
True, there were those who contended that the rule of lex loci
delicti was dead, at least in the United States, and it was superseded
by the rule that "[t]he local law of the state which has the most
significant relationship with the occurrence and with the parties
determines their rights and liabilities in tort. ' 42 Still this was almost
inevitably a subject of controversy and could be a source of expen-
sive litigation reducing the amount of any eventual recovery which
found its way into the pocket of the claimant. Further, it could be
argued that since the United States had withdrawn its notice of
denunciation and thus reaffirmed its adherence to the Warsaw
Convention, it had in effect, agreed to accept the limits of the
Convention except in cases covered by the Montreal Agreement.
Additionally, in most cases of U.S. citizens engaged in interna-
tional air travel other than to, from, or through the United States,
tickets will have been purchased outside the United States and thus
there may be no "treaty of jurisdiction" in a U.S. court under
article 28 of the Warsaw Convention.4 3 Consequently, there were
compelling reasons for the United States to press on with its efforts
in ICAO to secure a revision of the basic Warsaw Convention that
would meet the needs of the American traveler.
D. Further Efforts to Modify the Warsaw Convention
The first actions of the United States were hesitant and some-
41. Cf. Kennelly, Aviation Law: International Air Travel-A Brief Diag-
nosis and Prognosis, 6 CALIF. W. INT'L L.J. 86 (1975).
42. RESTATEMENT (SEcoN'D) OF CONFLICTS § 379(1) (1971).
43. Smith v. Canadian Pacific Airways, Ltd., 452 F.2d 798 (2d Cir. 1971).
See also McCarthy v. East African Airways Corp., 13 Av. L. REP. 18,385
(S.D.N.Y. 1974); Biggo v. Alitolia-Linee Aeree Itoliano, S. P. A., 10 Av. L.
REP. 18,354 (E.D.N.Y. 1969). The Warsaw Convention in paragraph 1 of
article 28 provides:
An action for damages must be brought, at the option of the plaintiff,
in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, either before the
court of the domicile of the carrier or of his principle place of business
through which the contract has been made or before the court at the
place of destination.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, at 3020.
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what indecisive. It participated on the Panel of Experts created by
ICAO to study the problem of how best to amend the Warsaw
Convention."' Also, the United States was a member of the sub-
committee which the Legal Committee of ICAO established in
September of 1967 to study the "Possible Revision of the Warsaw
Convention of 1929 as amended by the Hague Protocol of
1955."1 5 However, it was not until after the first meeting of the
subcommittee in late 1968 that the U.S. government undertook its
first in-depth consideration of what it wanted in an updated and
modernized Warsaw Convention.46 This study was undertaken by a
special ad hoc committee of the Interagency Group on Internation-
al Aviation (IGIA)4 7 appointed by the Secretary of Transportation
and chaired by his Deputy General Counsel.48
During the preliminary meetings, it became obvious that a
simple solution of the Warsaw problem by raising the limits to the
$75,000 figure of the Montreal Agreement or higher was not going
to meet the needs of the U.S. air traveler. A much more sophisticat-
ed approach was required to take into account not only the inade-
quate limit problem but also a number of other matters that had
become increasingly troublesome. The broad general target on
which the committee agreed was that a revised Convention should
assure claimants three benefits: certainty of recovery, speed of re-
covery and sufficiency of recovery. The special committee began
reviewing those elements of the existing Convention which it felt
needed change to achieve these objectives. These elements are dis-
cussed below.
1. The limit upon liability. It is a truism to say that the limit of
liability cannot be separated from the conditions of liability. But
this is really only partly so. For example, it is said that the easier it
is to "break" the limit, the lower that limit can be set. But, no
44. ICAO Doc. 8839-LC/158-2 (1969) at 73-74.
45. Id. at 81.
46. The primary reason for the rather inconclusive efforts of the first meet-
ing of the ICAO Legal Subcommittee was the absence of economic data pertaining
to the impact of higher limits on insurance costs that the member nations of
ICAO had been requested to provide. ICAO Doc. 8839-LC/158-1 (1969) at 72.
47. The Interagency Group on International Aviation was created by memo-
randum of the President, August 11, 1960, to develop U.S. international aviation
policy. 25 Fed. Reg. 7710 (1960).
48. The author was a member of this special ad hoc committee from its in-
ception and attended all the ICAO conferences for which the committee did the
preparatory work, including the Guatemala Conference. Much of what is set
forth herein is based upon this personal experience.
Vol. 6
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matter how easily the limit may be broken, there will always be
some exceptional cases where the limit will be effective, and thus
the amount of the limit has to bear some reasonable relationship to
the damages likely to be incurred in an ordinary case. In fact, the
basic U.S. concept for some time had been to establish a limit
within which most victims of air accidents would have full recov-
ery.
49
In solving the problem of the limit, the Ad Hoc Committee
had the benefit of a special study undertaken by the C.A.B. in
1968 of passenger recoveries (including both judgments and settle-
ments) in Warsaw and non-Warsaw Convention cases.5 0 This
study had been undertaken in response to an inquiry from ICAO
for economic data which would permit its Air Transport Commit-
tee to make recommendations to the Legal Committee concerning
the liability limit for an amended Warsaw Convention." In gener-
al, it showed that in the United States, between 19% and 20% of
death settlements and judgments in non-Warsaw Convention cases
(where no artificial limit to liability existed) exceeded $100,000
which figure necessarily included legal costs. While it is difficult to
break down in exact amounts the distribution of those recoveries
exceeding $100,000, it appeared to the IGIA Committee that if the
United States wanted to cover in excess of 90% of all recoveries
within the limits, something on the order of $150,000 would be
required. However, considering the dismal results of the U.S. pro-
posal for $100,000 as a limit at the Special ICAO Meeting in
1966, $150,000 appeared to have little chance of success.
52
Consequently, the lower figure of $125,000 was adopted by the
Committee as its initial negotiating position.58 However, to meet its
self-adopted criteria of "sufficiency of recovery" the Committee
considered that more was necessary.
49. Report of the Air Coordinating Committee, June 20, 1957 on U.S. Rati-
fication of the Hague Protocol. S. ExEc. H., 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1959).
50. Civil Aeronautics Board, Data on Insurance Costs and Accident Settle
ments and Judgments of United States Certificated Air Carriers, 1958-1967
[on file with CAB, FAA and ICAO]. For analysis of this report, see ICAO Doc.
8839-LC/158-1 (1969) at 54-57.
51. Report of the Air Transport Committee, ICAO Doc. 8839-LC/158-1
(1969) at 35-60.
52. ICAO Doc. 8584-LC/154-1 (1966) at 87. At this 1966 meeting only
five votes were cast for the $100,000 figure, while 36 were cast in opposition to it.
53. Statement of the United States on Revision of the Warsaw Convention
ICAO Doc. 8839-LC/158-1 (1969) at 293-94.
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2. Settlement inducement. One way to provide a more adequate
recovery without increasing the limit was to assure that more of the
ultimate recovery went into the pocket of the claimant. This desire
coincided with the fact that the United States had not been happy
with the provision dealing with the award of legal fees separate
from the limit that existed in the Hague Protocol. Originally, the
United States had been satisfied with that feature of the Hague
Protocol believing it would operate to increase the recovery of
American claimants. 54 However, on mature reflection it appeared
that the provision accepted at The Hague did not really accomplish
the hoped-for objective of providing, in certain cases, the award of
costs of litigation including attorneys' fees in addition to the limit.
Its main shortcoming was that such award was to be made by the
court "in accordance with its own law" so, in fact, if the existing
law of the forum did not authorize such awards, which appears to
be the case in most jurisdictions of the United States, the provision
did not accomplish the objective of increasing the claimant's poten-
tial recovery." Thus, this provision needed revision in any event,
and if properly written could serve also as a vehicle to augment the
recovery of the claimant.
The IGIA Committee eventually recommended a text which
preserved the original Hague Protocol concept that only in cases
where the air carrier made no offer of settlement (or made an
inadequate one) within six months of the accident should court
costs including attorneys' fees be awarded over and above the limit.
However, the new text provided that in such event that "the court
shall award" litigation expenses over and above the limit.
56
3. Periodic adjustment. The Committee was not quite through
with the problem of "sufficiency of recovery." The history of the
Warsaw Convention clearly demonstrated that a major problem
was that it was very difficult to adjust the liability limit to the
changing realities of economics. The United States had tried for ten
years to get a revision of the limit before obtaining some increase in
the Hague Protocol in 1955. Even if the United States had ratified
the Hague Protocol when originally submitted for the advice and
consent of the Senate in 1959, the limit would have been overtaken
54. See Report of the Air Coordinating Committee, supra note 49, at 18, 25.
55. For a discussion of this problem, see Lowenfeld supra note 3, at 509,
561-63.
56. Statement of U.S. Position on Revision of Warsaw Convention, ICAO
Doc. 8839-LC/158-1 (1969) at 294.
Vol. 6
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by changing economic conditions in less than ten years.57 Conse-
quently, some means to automatically adjust the amount of the
limit to reflect the constant upward thrust of settlements and re-
coveries in aviation accident cases had to be found. Otherwise the
limit would rapidly have become "insufficient" as inflation or a
steadily increasing standard of living ate into it. The special IGIA
Committee made no specific proposal on how this could best be
accomplished, but a number of alternatives were suggested which
were put forward at future meetings of ICAO." At that time, the
primary thrust of the U.S. view was that the increase should coin-
cide with the worldwide rate of inflation.
4. Basis of liability. As earlier noted, the United States had indi-
cated at the 1966 special ICAO meeting a willingness to consider
a regime of absolute liability in lieu of the existing Warsaw Con-
vention system with its shifted burden of proof 9 and its oppor-
tunities for breaking the limit.6" Further, absolute liability was a
basic part of the United States' willingness to accept the Montreal
Agreement. This had not gone unnoticed, and at the first meeting
in November, 1968, of the ICAO Legal Subcommittee studying the
Warsaw problem, the International Air Transport Association pre-
sented a paper on behalf of its member air carriers which stated
that they were willing "to accept, in respect of liability to passen-
gers, the absolute and definite liability system. . . ."' This would
be "coupled with a limit to protect against catastrophic losses
only."'6 2 As a quid pro quo for aceptance of such a system, IATA
indicated that the limit-breaking provisions for failure to comply
with documentation requirements63 and for "willful misconduct"
6 4
should be eliminated from the Convention.
The IGIA Committee in reviewing the Montreal Agreement
and the IATA statement concluded that the theory of absolute
liability had become generally acceptable, was proving workable in
57. See position of U.S. at Special ICAO Meeting, ICAO Docs. 8584-
LC/154-1, 154-2 (1966).
58. See U.S. Position, ICAO Doe. 8839-LC/158-1 (1969) at 307.
59. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 20.
60. Id., arts. 3, 15.
61. Statement by JATA to the ICAO Subcommittee of the Legal Committee
on the Question of Revision of the Warsaw Convention as amended by The Hague
Protocol, ICAO Doc. 8839-LC/158-1 (1969) at 91-93.
62. Id.
63. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 3.
64. Id., art. 25.
13
Boyle: The Guatemala Protocol to the Warsaw Convention
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1975
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
practice and should be retained in any new Convention. However,
the extent of "absoluteness" had yet to be determined. As earlier
noted, the Montreal Agreement made no mention of defenses, and
there were as yet a number of unresolved questions, such as whether
the airline would be liable if the event causing the damage was the
independent, possibly criminal, act of a third party. Ultimately, it
was concluded that since the air carrier was in the best position to
minimize the incidence of avoidable accidents and also to distribute
the costs of unavoidable accidents, no defenses should be allowed
the air carriers for accidents caused by the independent acts of
third parties. Specifically, no defense was to be permitted for cases
of hijacking, sabotage or war. However, the IGIA Committee felt
that the existing defense of contributory negligence should be
retained and broadened to include the deliberate wilful act of the
claimant, in order to prevent a saboteur from profiting in any way
from his own act.65 Obviously, the Committee expected such a
regime to contribute to its objectives of "certainty of recovery" and
"speed of recovery." Certainly, the need for litigation should be
substantially reduced since the only issue open for controversy or
litigation under such a regime would be the amount of the damage.
The Committee then considered that portion of the IATA
paper which reflected the air carriers' desire to eliminate the possi-
bilities of breaking the liability limit under a regime of absolute
liability. It concluded that the United States should reflect a will-
ingness to accept such conditions but should not intitiate or urge
them. In fact, in the case of notice to the passenger of the possibili-
ty that the air carrier's liability might be limited, 66 the IGIA Com-
mittee proposed that the requirement for notice be retained but
that failure to give such notice be the subject only of an increase in
the limit, not its total elimination. However, on this latter point the
United States was prepared to accept deletion of the requirement of
notice in the treaty so long as it was clear that each government
remained free to require such notice in tickets which were sold
subject to its legal jurisdiction.
67
5. Additional forum. One of the provisions of the Warsaw Con-
vention which had become increasingly troublesome was the fact
that under certain circumstances, an action could not be maintained
against the air carrier at the domicle or permanent residence of the
65. U.S. Position, ICAO Doc. 8839-LC/158-1 (1969) at 293.
66. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 3.
67. See Revised Proposal of U.S., ICAO Doc. 8839-LC/158-1 (1969) at 32.
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claimant, even though the air carrier was otherwise amenable to suit
in that jurisdiction.68 This arose out of the provisions of article 28
of the Warsaw Convention limiting actions to courts in contracting
states which were: (1) the court of the domicile of the carrier or its
principal place of business; (2) the place where the contract was
made; or, (3) the place of destination. In effect, the Warsaw
Convention operated to deny U.S. citizens access to their own
courts to which, absent the Convention, they were entitled under
existing law. The Committee felt this needed correction, and as
part of their recommended U.S. position urged that the court of the
claimant's residence or domicile should be open to him if the
carrier was otherwise subject to its jurisdiction .
9
These five principal provisions were the basis of the U.S.
negotiation position in the next series of ICAO meetings. Actually,
taken together, they called for a wholly new system of compensa-
tion for death or personal injury occurring in international air
transportation. The position recognized the benefits of a uniform
legal system so that all concerned-passenger, air carrier and
shipper-had identical legal rights without regard to where the
event causing damage might occur. However, the position made it
clear that this uniformity, desirable as it might be, was not worth
the price of low limits of liability, and that any limit would have to
be one that provided full compensation for a substantial majority of
claimants within a system guaranteeing recovery in almost all cases.
The key to the new system-absolute liability of the carrier with
virtually no defenses-recognized the fact that in aviation accident
cases in which multiple deaths often arise from a single incident,
where proof of fault can be difficult and expensive and where the
carrier is in the best position through insurance to distribute the
costs of compensation, departure from the old rules of tort com-
pensation is warranted. This represented the culmination of several
years of developmental thinking within the concerned agencies of
the United States government, and it became the basis for subse-
quent negotiation in ICAO on the Warsaw Convention.
7 0
The story of the U.S. negotiation of its position in ICAO and
in the Diplomatic Conference in Guatemala has been set forth
68. For an interesting comment on this problem, see Mendelsohn, A Con-
flict of Laws Approach to the Warsaw Convention, 33 J. Am L. 624 (1967).
69. ICAO Doc. 8839-LC/158-1 (1969) at 295.
70. The IGIA Committee consisted of: The Departments of State, Com-
merce, Defense and Transportation, and the Civil Aeronautics Board. See note
47, supra.
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elsewhere and will not be repeated here.7' The essential element of
this negotiation which began with the first presentation of this U.S.
proposal in 1969 and continued through the Diplomatic Confer-
ence in 1971 was that it represented a "package." Each element
was interdependent, and the United States could not bargain below
the limits set forth in its "final" position at the first meeting at
which it was presented. 72 Even a major development which forced
a substantial change in one aspect of the United States position, the
continued impact of the rising standard of living and inflation upon
recoveries in the United States for death or injury in aviation
accidents, did not change the view of the United States that what it
sought to do in a revised Warsaw Convention was to create a new
system of tort compensation. For that reason, it was considered
essential that all elements of its "package" remain intact.
71
In achieving this new system of tort compensation in the
Guatemala Protocol what major changes are made in the text of
the Warsaw Convention, and what considerations are involved in
these specific language changes? The remainder of this article is
devoted to analysis of each of the articles which cover essential
details, indicating the extent to which they reflect the U.S. views set
out above.
II. THE ARTICLES OF THE GUATEMALA PROTOCOL
A. Article I
This article provides that the amendments of the Guatemala
Protocol are amendments to the text of the Warsaw Convention as
amended by the Hague Protocol of 1955. As indicated earlier, the
United States has never ratified the Hague Protocol, and should it
ratify the Guatemala Protocol, the United States, is in effect,
accepting the provisions of the Hague Protocol except as the Gua-
temala Protocol modifies that document. As earlier indicated, the
major reason why the United States did not ratify the Hague
71. Boyle, The Warsaw Convention, THE FORUM (1972) [hereinafter cited
as FORUM]; Boyle, Kriendler and McPherson, The Guatemala Protocol: Three
Views, 6 AKRON L. REV. 119 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Three Views].
72. ICAO Doc. 8839-LC/158-1 (1969) at 27.
73. Report of the Working Group on National Systems for Supplementary
Compensation, International Conference on Air Law, Guatemala, 1971, ICAO
Doc. 9040-LC/167-1 (1972) at 244. See also FORUM, supra, note 71. For a dis-
cussion of the Supplementary Compensation problem see text associated with
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Protocol was its low limit of liability.74 Since the Guatemala Proto-
col cures this defect and since the other provisions of the Hague
Protocol were considered satisfactory by both the executive branch
and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate,
75
acceptance of the amendments to the Warsaw Convention made by
the Hague Protocol should not be an obstacle.
B. Article H
Article II revises article 3 of the Warsaw Convention dealing
with notice to the passenger that the liability of the carrier to him
might be limited. It eliminates the former language which required
such notice on the ticket and delivery of the ticket to the passenger
before embarkation. Under article II failure by the carrier to do
either no longer results in loss of the protection of the liability limit.
The article also removes language which required certain informa-
tion to be on the ticket, dnd now permits such information to be
communicated through other means.
The minutes of the meetings of the Legal Committee of
ICAO and the Diplomatic Conference reflect at least two principal
reasons for these changes. The first, initially articulated by
IATA, 76 was to eliminate failure to give proper notice as a poten-
tial basis for "breaking" the limits as occurred in the case of Lisi v.
Alitalia Airlines.77 The other, and possibly more persuasive argu-
ment, in view of the new and higher limit which should restrain
efforts to "break," thus providing more return to claimants, was
to permit the air carriers greater flexibility in ticketing. For exam-
ple, on-board ticketing, now common on air shuttles is forbidden
by the original Warsaw Convention; so also are computerized
systems currently under development, including automatic credit
card ticketing.
The United States supported elimination of specific ticketing
requirements, but, as earlier indicated would have retained the
obligation to give notice of the limitation of liability, but only at the
risk of an increase in the limit of liability, not the complete removal
of the limit. However, the United States accepted the complete
elimination of the notice requirement, but did so on the express
74. S. EXEC. REP. No. 3, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1969).
75. Id. at 6.
76. See note 61, supra.
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understanding set forth in the record that the absence of the
requirement in the treaty did not prevent a Contracting State from
requiring such notice under its own laws in the case of any air




This article is consequential upon the changes made by the
prior article. Its effect is to conform article 4 of the Warsaw
Convention dealing with the passenger baggage check to reflect
the changes made with respect to the passenger ticket.
D. Article IV
Article IV amends in a number of ways article 17 of the
Warsaw Convention as amended by the Hague Protocol. Since
these changes are among the most important modifications made
by the Guatemala Protocol they will be separately discussed.
1. "Personal injury" for "bodily injury". The French text of the
original Warsaw Convention which at that time was the only
official text, provides in article 17:
Le transporteur est responsable du dommage survenu in cas
de mort, de blessure, ou de toute autre 16sion corporelle subie
par un voyageur .... 79
The translation of this text used by the U.S. Government is:
The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event
of the death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily
injury suffered by a passenger. .... 80
No change in this provision was made by the Hague Proto-
col.8 ' However, in the Guatemala Protocol changes in the English
text were made. So far as is pertinent to this point, no change was
made in the French text. It remained "survenu en cas de mort, de
blessure, ou de toute autre 16sion corporelle subie par . ... "'
However, in the English text the phrase "personal injury" was
78. ICAO Doc. 8878-LC/162 (1970) at 48.
79. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, at 3005.
80. Id. at 3018.
81. S. ExEc. H., 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1959).
82. ICAO Doe. 8932 (1971) at 1. The new French text used the word
"passenger" instead of the word "voyageur" but that appears to have no bearing
on this matter. It also introduced the phrase "du prejudice" in the first line for
reasons to be discussed later.
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substituted for the phrase "bodily injury." The new English text,
now an official one, reads in pertinent part:
The carrier is liable for damage sustained in case of death
or personal injury of a passenger. .... 83
There is little or no "legislative history" which is helpful in
determining what, if any, reasons lie behind this change. It was
originally made by the Drafting Committee of the Legal Commit-
tee of ICAO at its 17th Session, meeting in Montreal in February
1970. The change was noted in the report of the Chairman of the
Drafting Committee in his introduction of the new text, but no
substantive discussion of the reason for the change appears to have
occurred.84
At the Diplomatic Conference at Guatemala, the draft articles
which contained the change noted above as prepared by the Legal
Committee were adopted as the basis for the work of the Confer-
ence and discussed article by article."5 Again, there seems to have
been no substantive discussion of the change. One explanation for
this lack of discussion is that it was not considered to be a change
at all. As noted above, there was no change in the French
text, and thus it can be argued that this was merely a change in the
English translation of the French phrase "lesion corporelle" from
"bodily injury" to "personal injury" without intending any substan-
tive change.
This view is supported by two additional facts. First, the
Spanish translations of the original Warsaw text used the phrase
"lesion corporal"86 and no change was made in that language in
the Guatemala Protocol where the official Spanish language text
uses this phrase.8 7 Second, according to the final clause of the
Guatemala Protocol, the French language shall prevail in the case
of any inconsistency. 88 Since there was no change in the pertinent
provisions of the French language, it may be argued that no change
was made by the new English text.
These arguments, of course, do not necessarily settle the
question. The most they can do is to reach the conclusion that
whatever was included under the original Warsaw Convention, to
83. Id. at 7.
84. ICAO Doc. 8878-LC/162 (1970) at 187.
85. ICAO Doc. 9040-LC/167-1 (1972) at 29; 9040-LC/167-2 (1972) at 18.
86. ICAO Doec. 9040-LC/167-2 (1972) at 187.
87. ICAO Doc. 8932 (1971) at 13.
88. Id. at 11.
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which the United States was and still is a party, will be included
under the Guatemala Protocol. In fact, it is possible that no change
would have been made in the English text if certain cases currently
in litigation had been underway in 1971. For example, in Rosman
and Herman v. Trans World Airlines Inc.8 9 the precise issue of
what the phrase "bodily injury" contemplates was raised. As stated
by the New York Court of Appeals, the issue there was whether the:
[P]laintiffs should be allowed to prove damages for palpable,
objective bodily injuries suffered, whether caused by psychic
trauma or by the physical conditions on the aircraft, irre-
spective of impact, but not for psychic trauma alone. 90
The contention of the plaintiffs, of course, was that psychic
trauma alone was fully compensable under the Warsaw Conven-
tion. After first rejecting the contention that the treaty requires the
application of French law and French legal usage in determining
the meaning of "bodily injury" in this context, the court concluded
that it should determine the legal significance of the term in light of
"the purposes of the Convention and the ordinary meaning of its
terms . , "91 and then stated:
[I]n seeking to apply the treaty's terms to the facts before us,
we ask whether the treaty's use of the word "bodily", in its
ordinary meaning, can fairly be said to include "mental".
We deal with the term as used in an international agreement
written almost [fifty] years ago, a term which even today
would have little significance in the treaty as an adjective
modifying "injury" except to impart a distinction from "men-
tal". In our view, therefore, the ordinary, natural meaning
of "bodily injury" as used in article 17 connotes palpable,
conspicuous physical injury, and excludes mental injury with
no observable "bodily", as distinguished from "behavioral",
manifestations.
92
Certainly it is conceivable the analysis used by the New York
Court of Appeals in the Rosman and Herman cases would have
given some pause to the revision of the English text if it had
occurred before the fact. However, this was not the case and there
is now an interesting question-does the change in the English text
enlarge the scope of the Convention? Possibly some legislative
89. 34 N.Y.2d 385, 314 N.E.2d 848, 358 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1974),
90. Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 314 N.E.2d 848, 850 (1974).
91. Id. at 854.
92. Id. at 855 (footnote omitted). See also Burnett v. Trans World Air-
lines, Inc., 368 F. Supp. 1152 (D.N.M. 1973).
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history occurring during the treaty ratification process will be able
to reduce or eliminate what may otherwise be a problem of inter-
pretation.
2. Absolute liability. As earlier noted, the Warsaw Convention,
both in its original form and as amended by the Hague Protocol,
provides the air carriers with defenses to claims for damage, the
fate of which are discussed below. However, in article 17 the first
change is made to implement the absolute liability theory of the
Convention. Under the new language, the carrier is liable "upon
condition only that the event which caused the death or injury took
place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations
of embarking or disembarking."93
This language makes several changes of some significance.
First, the phrase "upon condition only" was introduced in the text
to reflect the new principal of absolute liability. In fact, the original
text in English submitted by the Legal Committee of ICAO read
"upon proof only. . . ."' However, this latter phrase was object-
ed to because some thought it introduced the concept of burden of
proof which was inconsistent with the adoption of the theory of
absolute liability.95 Thus, apparently in a move to further clarify
this point, the Conference adopted the phrase "upon condition
only." This action was designed to further minimize any small
burden of proof that might have been laid upon the claimant by the
original language of the Legal Committee, and to reinforce the
principle of absolute liability.
Another change incorporated in the new article 17 is the
substitution of the word "event" for the word "accident." In gener-
al it appears to have been the intention of the Conference to
broaden the scope of the Convention to include an occurrence
which might not be classed as an accident but which nevertheless
caused death or injury. Among these "events" was the deliberate
act of a third person including a hijacker or saboteur.96 Other
"events" probably encompassed in the new term but probably not
considered "accidents" are air turbulence, unusual or violent
changes in the attitude or direction of the aircraft, trips and falls
93. ICAO Doc. 8932 (1971) at 7.
94. ICAO Doc. 9040-LC/167-2 (1972) at 14.
95. ICAO Doc. 9040-LC/167-1 (1972) at 33, 34; for contrary views, see
id. at 38.
96. Chairman of Legal Committee Drafting Group, ICAO Doc. 8878-LC/
162 (1970) at 187.
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and spills, particularly of hot foods and beverages. In fact, the
substantial enlargement of the scope of coverage of the Convention
by the use of this new term led directly to another change in article
17.
3. "State of health of the passenger." The Diplomatic Conference
seems to have been agreed that the air carrier should not be
responsible for death or injury occurring on board the aircraft or in
the course of embarkation or disembarkation if the death or injury
was a consequence of some physical defect of the passenger. The
use of the word "event" instead of "accident" intensified this
concern because, as just noted, an encounter with clear air turbul-
ence might be fatal to a passenger with a heart condition while
harmless to healthy passengers, and because such an occurrence
was now clearly an "event" but not necessarily an "accident."97
Suggestions that the carrier be relieved of its liability in this type of
situation to the extent it could prove that the passenger's health
contributed to the damage were defeated, primarily because such a
standard would give rise to substantial litigation, and therefore
prejudice the theory of absolute liability.98 The ultimate solution
gives the carrier a potential defense only if the death or injury
(presumably on proof by the carrier) "resulted solely from the
state of health of the passenger."
4. Baggage. The revised article 17 contains two new paragraphs
which deal with the liability of the carrier for the baggage of the
passenger. These provisions were in article 18 of the original
Warsaw Convention along with provisions dealing with the car-
riage of cargo. The Diplomatic Conference decided not to deal
with the subject of cargo at the Guatemala meeting, and thus
continued for cargo the regime of liability under the original
Warsaw Convention.99 However, it was decided to make the bag-
gage of passengers subject to the rule of absolute liability, and thus,
the Conference added paragraphs 2 and 5 to article 17.
97. ICAO Doe. 9040-LC/167-1 (1972) at 118.
98. Id. at 49, 50.
99. This decision appears never to have been explicitly taken. The Legal
Committee considered the possibility of drafting amendments to revise the cargo
rules but did not attempt such action. See Annexes C, D & E to Report of the
Legal Committee, ICAO Doc. 8878-LC/162 (1970) at 28-38. The Diplomatic
Conference in choosing the form of a protocol rather than a complete new text
of the entire Convention to make its changes necessarily opted for the exclusion
of changes in the cargo text except as consequential upon changes made with re-
spect to passengers. See Minutes, The Form of the New Instrument, ICAO Doc.
9040-LC/167-12 (1972) at 219-28.
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Paragraph 2 establishes essentially the same liability regime
for baggage as for passengers, allowing only the defense of "inher-
ent defect, quality or vice" of the baggage. The time within which
the carrier is responsible for the baggage remains virtually the same
as it was under the original Warsaw Convention, not only while the
baggage is actually on board the aircraft but also "during any
period within which the baggage was in charge of the carrier."'100
Paragraph 3 of the revised text does away with an outmoded
distinction between "checked" and "unchecked" baggage and
makes it clear that the responsibility of the carrier for damage
extends to "both checked baggage and objects carried by the
passenger. '
E. Article V
As just noted, article 18 of the unamended Warsaw Conven-
tion contained the rules of liability of the carrier for the carriage of
cargo. Its revision by the Diplomatic Conference at Guatemala was
consequential upon the decision to subject baggage to the rule of
absolute liability but not to deal at this meeting with the rules on
cargo. Thus, the revision made to article 18 is intended to apply the
rules of the Warsaw Convention, as amended by the Hague Proto-
col, to the carriage of cargo without substantive change.
F. Article VI
Two essential changes in the provisions of article 20 of the
Warsaw Convention are made by this provision of the Guatemala
Protocol. 10 2 The first change is to strike the paragraph which, in
the case of the death or personal injury of a passenger, gave the
carrier the defense of proving "that he and his agents have taken all
necessary measures to avoid the damage or that it was impossible
for him or them to take such measures."'1 0 3 However, it was
concluded that such defense should continue to be available to the
carrier for the case of "delay" to passengers and baggage, and for
100. Guatemala Protocol, supra note 2, at 613.
101. Id.
102. The Hague Protocol made only a minor amendment to the original War-
saw Convention by deleting paragraph 2 of article 20 which permitted, in the case
of cargo and baggage, the additional defense of "an error in piloting, in the handl-
ing of the aircraft, or in navigation." ICAO Doc. 7632 (1955) at 7.
103. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, at 3019.
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that reason, the new article 20 in paragraph 1 retains the former
defense for this limited class of damage.
As earlier indicated, the Diplomatic Conference made no
changes in the rules governing the carriage of cargo, and thus it
was necessary to provide in paragraph 2 of new article 20 for the
retention of the "all reasonable measures" defense for the case of
"damage resulting from destruction, loss, damage or delay . .. "104
arising out of the carriage of cargo.
G. Article VII
Two changes are made by the Guatemala Protocol to the
provisions of article 21 of the Warsaw Convention. The first of
these relates to the defense of contributory negligence. Under the
original provisions of article 21, the court seized of the case could
"in accordance with the provisions of its own law, exonerate the
carrier wholly or partly from his liability."' °5 The result was a
rather uneven treatment of the problem of contributory negligence
because of the differing treatment of the defense of contributory
negligence among the nations party to the Warsaw Convention
which uneven treatment the Diplomatic Conference intended to
end.' 0 6 The new article now provides a uniform rule:
[T]he carrier shall be wholly or partly exonerated from his
liability to such person to the extent that such negligence or
wrongful act or omission caused or contributed to the dam-
age.' 07
One interesting development since the Guatemala meeting has
been a discussion of whether the just-quoted sentence is intended
to reduce the limit of liability of the carrier or whether it is intended
to reduce the amount of the damages the claimant has established.
As an example, and using as a rough equivalent of the new limit in
article 22 the sum of $120,000, take the case of a claimant with
provable damages of $240,000 who, the court finds, contributed
50% to the damage. Should the claimant's damages be reduced
50% to $120,000 (the carrier's maximum liability under article
22), or should that maximum liability be reduced by 50% to $60,-
104. Guatemala Protocol, supra note 3, at 614.
105. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, at 3019.
106. See Minutes, ICAO Doc. 9040-LC/167-1 (1972) at 95-98. For a discus-
sion of the U.S. rule on contributory negligence, see Maki v. Frelk, 40 I11. 2d 193,
239 N.E.2d 445 (1968).
107. Guatemala Protocol, supra note 3, at 614.
Vol. 6
24
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 6, No. 1 [1975], Art. 3
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol6/iss1/3
THu GUATEMALA PROTOCOL
000? In the one case, the claimant recovers $120,000, in the
other $60,000. It is the opinion of this writer that the correct view
is that the amount of the damage, not the limit of liability, is re-
duced. This is based on the fact that in the normal case, the rule
of comparative negligence operates to reduce the amount which a
claimant can recover; it only indirectly operates to reduce the
obligation of the defendant to compensate. In this sense, in a
normal situation the doctrine has been referred to as one of "ap-
portionment of damages."1 8 However, in a case under the Guate-
mala Protocol where negligence of the defendant carrier is clearly
not at issue because he is absolutely liable regardless of fault, no
apportionment between the claimant's and defendant's negligence
can occur, thus leaving only the possibility of reducing the
claimant's recovery to the extent it can be shown that the damage
was the result of his negligence. Certainly, in a case involving
major damage to a claimant, for example, $300,000, it would be
unfair and inequitable to not only reduce his claim from $300,-
000 to $150,000 (assuming his negligence to be 50%) but also
reduce the carrier's limit of liability 50% to $60,000 under the
assumption previously made earlier as to the liability limit.
The view that the intended reduction is only in the amount of
the damages and not the amount of the limit is further supported
by the fact that the minutes and documents of the Conference show
some delegates referring to this article as reducing "damages;" no
delegate is quoted as referring to it as reducing the amount of the
limit of liability. 10 9
H. Article VIII
This article makes a complete revision of article 22 of the
Warsaw Convention as amended by the Hague Protocol which
contains the major provisions dealing with the amount of the limit
of liability. Since these revisions are of major significance they will
be taken up paragraph by paragraph.
1. Paragraph 1. Paragraph 1(a) is revised to state the limit of
liability of the air carrier as 1,500,000 francs, up from 250,000
under the Warsaw Convention as amended by the Hague Protocol.
Expressed in terms of U.S. dollars, according to the "official rate"
108. See Annot., 32 A.L.R.3d 467 (1970); 57 AM. JUR. 2d Negligence § 426
(1971).
109. See Proposal of Ireland, ICAO Doc. 9040-LC/167-2 (1972) at 38; dele-
gates' discussion of problem, ICAO Doc. 9040-LC/167-1 (1972) at 95-97.
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now existing, this amounts to $120,000.110 However, according to
the U.S. "official rate" existing at the time of opening the Guate-
mala Protocol for signature, March 8, 1971, that limit in U.S.
dollars was $100,000. The ramifications of this change and other
related problems will be taken up in connection with paragraph 4
below.
Another change introduced into this paragraph by the confer-
ence at Guatemala was the concluding phrase of its first sentence
"for the aggregate of the claims, however founded, in respect of
damage suffered as a result of the death or personal injury of each
passenger.""' Presumably, this phrase was introduced to assure
absolute "unbreakability" of the liability limit, but due to the way
the Diplomatic Conference approached its work, an amendment
to article 24 which appeared to accomplish the same purpose,
had already been adopted. The introduction of this phrase in article
22 ostensibly for the same purpose stirred a significant debate." 2
It was explained as necessary despite the existence of the
provision of article 24 on the theory that article 24 dealt only with
the problem of liability of the air carrier for the death or personal
injury of each passenger and did not deal with the case of the
liability of the air carrier to others-manufacturers, suppliers, air
traffic control agencies and so forth. This class may have been sued
by passengers and may have paid damages for death and personal
injury beyond the limit and be seeking compensation for such
damages from the carrier through recourse actions. It is a little
difficult to see how this clause operates to prevent that type of
recovery against the air carrier any better than does the language in
article 24, but after substantial debate it was inserted here, presum-
ably to prevent indirect breaking of the liability limit of the carrier.
Paragraph (1) also deletes from article 22 the sentence ex-
pressly providing for contracts for higher limits of liability:
Nevertheless, by special contract, the carrier and the passenger
may agree to a higher limit of liability.
113
The recommendation to delete this sentence had come from the
draft prepared by the ICAO Legal Committee and reflected an
interesting debate by that Committee. The proposal to delete the
110. Pub. L. No. 93-110 (Sept. 21, 1973).
111. Guatemala Protocol, supra note 2, at 614.
112. ICAO Doc. 9040-LC/167-1 (1972) at 264.
113. Hague Protocol, supra note 9, at 381.
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sentence had stemmed from the same consideration as the amend-
ment just discussed-to remove any possibility that a new and
higher limit of liability might be broken."' During the debate, a
further elaboration had occurred with a proposal that not only
should the sentence recognizing contracts for a higher limit of
liability be deleted, but that one should be added specifically
forbidding such a contract.115
After extensive debate, the proposal to delete the sentence was
agreed to, but the proposal to add a sentence expressly forbidding
contracts for a higher limit of liability was defeated. 116 During the
debate, the United States and others made it clear that, in their
view, the mere deletion of the sentence would not preclude entering
into such contracts which would continue to be legally proper
between the parties." 7 During the consideration of article 22 at the
Diplomatic Conference, no specific discussion of this problem is
found other than the fact that the Conference took the text as
prepared by the Legal Committee of ICAO as its basis of discus-
sion. Since there was no discussion of the recommendation of the
Legal Committee, and since it is apparent that the recommendation
to delete was adopted, it is the assumption of the writer that the
views expressed by the Legal Committee control the interpretation
to be given to the removal of the sentence. On this basis it is
concluded that contracts for a higher limit of liability between the
carrier and the passenger are proper unless forbidden by the law
otherwise applicable to such contracts.
Paragraph (1) of new article 22 contains two subparagraphs
(b) and (c) which find no exact counterpart in the Warsaw
Convention as amended by the Hague Protocol. The first of these
specifies that the limit of liability of the carrier for "delay" of a
passenger shall be 62,500 francs, or roughly, at current "official
rates," 4,800 U.S. dollars. The second of these specifies a limit of
15,000 francs (about 1,200 U.S. dollars) for "destruction, loss,
damage or delay" of baggage.
The limit on delay of passengers was added because no
separate limit in the case of delay existed under the original or
114. ICAO Doc. 8878-LC/162 (1970) at 201.
115. Id. at 203.
116. Id. at 205.
117. Id. See remarks of delegates of United States, at 202, 207; France at
203; Sweden at 203; Spain at 204; Trinidad and Tobago at 204.
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amended Warsaw Convention, the applicable limit in such case
being the overall limit of the carrier.
In effect, there is a reduction in the limit of liability for delay
from $20,000118 to $4,800. However, for this limited situation the
new limit seems adequate. In the case of passenger baggage, the
old limit was divided into two parts: 5,000 francs ($400) for
baggage the passenger had in his own charge and 250 francs per
kilogram (about $7.50 per pound) in the case of checked baggage.
While the new standard is markedly different from the old, the
total limit of $1,200 for "destruction, loss, damage or delay" of
baggage seems adequate to protect the traveling public.
2. Paragraph 2. Paragraph 2(a) and (b) of new article 22 deal
separately with the limit of liability of the carrier in the carriage of
cargo. Other than the changes consequential upon removing refer-
ences to the carriage of baggage, this paragraph is identical to the
provisions of the Warsaw Convention as amended by the Hague
Protocol. In passing, it might be noted that these paragraphs retain
the provision relating to "a special declaration of interest in deliv-
ery at destination . . ."119 whereby a higher limit of liability may
be agreed upon, despite the earlier action of the Conference in
striking the provision relating to a higher limit of liability for the
carriage of passengers. However, since the carriage of cargo was
not put under a regime of absolute liability and in fact was left
aside for later consideration at another conference,120 this differ-
ence can be explained on that basis.
3. Paragraph 3. This paragraph of article 22 is a substantial
revision of those provisions of the Warsaw Convention as amended
at the Hague which dealt with costs of litigation which, under
certain circumstances may be awarded independently of the limit.
In essence, these provisions reflect the views advocated by the
United States in the Legal Committee of ICAO and at the Guate-
mala meeting.' 2 ' Under the new wording, courts of Contracting
States which do not, under their own law, have the power to award
costs of litigation in whole or in part "shall, in actions to which this
Convention applies, have the power to award, in their discretion, to
the claimant the whole or part of the costs of the action, including
118. See Hague Protocol, supra note 9, at 381.
119. Id.
120. This conference was held in Montreal during September, 1975.
121. See note 56, supra.
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lawyers' fees which the court considers reasonable."'' 22 This
amount is not to be taken into account in applying the liability
limits. The new language also retains the principle of the Hague
Protocol that these awards can be made only when the claimant has
given the carrier notice of the amount claimed and the basis
thereof, and the carrier has failed, within six months thereafter, to
make an offer of settlement which, subject to the limit, is equal to
the compensation ultimately awarded.
4. Paragraph 4. Paragraph 4 of article 22 contains a provision
which at the time of this writing is of major importance. In fact, its
impact on the other provisions of article VIII may well decide
whether the Guatemala Protocol will ever come into force. On the
surface, the paragraph is simple enough. It repeats the definition of
a "franc" which was adopted in the Hague Protocol. In essence,
this definition does not call the "franc" a "French franc" which the
original Warsaw Convention did, but instead defines it as a "cur-
rency unit consisting of sixty-five and a half milligrammes of gold
of millesimal fineness nine hundred."' 23 It then provides that the
sums in "francs" may be converted "into national currencies" and
if these currencies are other than gold, such conversion "shall, in
case of judicial proceedings, be made according to the value of
such currencies at the date of the judgment.'
' 24
The problem is whether the conversion should be at the world
market price or at the "official" price for gold in the country in
which the judgment is rendered. There is a major difference
between the two. At world market prices of gold in the neighbor-
hood of $180 an ounce which have occurred on some markets,
1,500,000 francs can convert to in excess of $500,000 instead of
$120,000, which the U.S. "official" price of $42.22 per ounce
would bring. This being the case, the international airlines ques-
tioned whether they could accept the absolute liability of the Con-
vention, when in effect, the quid pro quo of an effective and un-
breakable limit was gone.' 25
This is no longer an academic discussion. The highest court of
The Netherlands in a recent case 126 held that the conversion rate of
122. Guatemala Protocol, supra note 2, at 614.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See IATA statement, note 61, supra.
126. SS Hornland v. SS President Angot, 7 European Transport Law 933
(1972).
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the gold franc under the International Convention on the Limita-
tion of the Liability of Owners of Sea-Going Ships127 should be at
the Netherlands official rate. But the Athens Court of Appeal in
applying the Hague Protocol to a case of lost baggage on Olympic
Airways held that the market value of gold on the Athens Stock
Exchange determined the conversion rate.128 Added to this, of
course, is the recent action of the President of the United States,
authorizing private ownership of gold by U.S. citizens, 2 9 which
some view as an indication that the United States may be moving
toward a repeal of the U.S. "official rate" for gold.
So long as the U.S. "official rate" for gold continues to exist, a
strong case can be made that the Athens court was wrong and that
The Netherlands court was right. The existing text of paragraph 4,
article 22 of the Guatemala Protocol comes via the Hague Protocol
from another air law convention, 3 ' the Rome Convention on
Surface Damage by Aircraft. 13 The basic concept of doing away
with the "French franc" and using a defined "currency unit" was
formulated at the Rome Conference. An examination of the min-
utes of that Diplomatic Conference leaves little doubt that it was
intended to "leave it up to the national legislations of the countries
to define the method of conversion and not to attempt to impose a
method for defining the relationship between their currency in
circulation and the Poincare franc.' 1 2
Further, the entire record of the negotiations before and
during the Guatemala Conference show conclusively that the basic
figure for discussion was $100,000 U.S. dollars. All during that
period, roughly 1969 to 1971, the official rate for gold in the
United States was $35 per ounce which converts into approximately
1,500,000 francs using the formula now in paragraph 4 of article
22. Thus, it seems clear that conversion at the "official rate" was
intended rather than at the world market price which was approx-
imately $39 per ounce during February and March of 1971
127. International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating
to the Limitation of the Liability of Owners of Seagoing Vessels, signed at Brus-
sels Aug. 25, 1924, 120 L.N.T.S. 123.
128. Case No. 256 (1974).
129. See Pub. L. No. 93-110 (Sept. 21, 1973).
130. ICAO Doc. 7379-LC/34 (1953) at 249-69.
131. Convention on Damage Caused by Foreign Aircraft to Third Parties on
the Surface, done at Rome Oct. 7, 1952, 310 U.N.T.S. 181.
132. ICAO Doc. 7379-LC/34 (1953) at 346-47.
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when final debates on the limit was occurring. 13
Because of the uncertainty just discussed, the international air
carriers have recommended against any steps to ratify the Guate-
mala Protocol until the issue of gold convertibility and its effect
on the liability limit is resolved. These carriers, through their offi-
cial industry organizations, IATA, and the Air Transport Associa-
tion of America, have advised the United States that so long as
the uncertainty as to gold continues they "are not able to continue
to support ratification of the Protocol or to commit themselves to
a Supplemental Plan."' 4
The international air carriers suggested that resolution of this
problem might result from revision of paragraph 4 of article
VIII of the Guatemala Protocol. This would have the effect of
using the "official" price of gold on March 8, 1971, to freeze the
value of the limits in paragraph 1 of article VIII in terms of the
currencies of the ratifying countries, while allowing subsequent
changes in the values of such currencies in relation to the March 8,
1971, figure.3 5 Thus, in the case of U.S. dollars, the 1,500,000
francs in paragraph 1 would be $100,000 on March 8, 1971, but
today because of subsequent changes in the value of the dollar
relative to the March 8, 1971 figure, the 1,500,000 franc limit
133. However, no matter how good a case can be made for using the "official
rate" rather than the world market price, it will not serve to answer the problem
if the United States and other countries abandon any "official" price for gold.
This seems very likely to occur. In January of 1975, at meetings of the finance
ministers of countries represented in the International Monetary Fund, prelim-
inary steps looking toward the eventual abolition of the "official price" for gold
were taken. Business Week, Jan. 20, 1975, at 20; N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1975, §
1, at 1, col. 6. In fact, final action by the IMF may occur in the near future;
see the action taken by the IMF at its Jamaica meeting on Jan. 9, 1976. N.Y.
Times, Jan. 9, 1976, § 1, at 1, col. 4. Thereafter, individual country actions
will be taken. Since the United States generally has been following a policy of
eventually reducing gold to the status of a commodity and removing it from any
monetary status, it is likely that the United States would be among those nations
following such a recommendation of the IMF.
134. Statements of IATA and ATA in letters of April 7, 1975 and April 10,
1975 to Deputy Assistant Secretary for Transportation and Telecommunications,
Department of State.
135. Id. The text of both letters on this point states:
This might be achieved by an amendment to clarify the intention of the
Guatemala Protocol which would state that the limits of liability ex-
pressed therein are to be converted into national currencies at the official
gold value of those currencies as of the date the Protocol was opened for
signature (March 8, 1971), adjusted to take account of officially declared
devaluations or revaluations of the currency of the State where action for
recovery under the Protocol is instituted.
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would now be $120,000.130 Of course, future fluctuations in cur-
rencies would also affect those values.
There are other possible solutions to be considered if amend-
ment of the Protocol is the route chosen to resolve the problem.
One possible solution is to express the limit in terms of U.S.
dollars or some other currency rather than a defined currency
unit. However, this gives the country whose currency is used
somewhat of an advantage arising out of current practices of gov-
ernments in controlling currency values in relation to other cur-
rencies for purposes of improving their trading posture. For this
reason it might not be an acceptable solution.
Another possibility is to express the limit in terms of the
Special Drawing Rights used by the International Monetary Fund
which, since it is based upon a "basket" or "cocktail" of currencies,
does not have the disadvantage just mentioned. However, since not
all countries participate in the International Monetary Fund and
since only some of the participants' currencies are in the "basket,"
this also may not be fully acceptable. However, it may be more
easily agreed upon than other solutions having graver political and
economic problems.
Whatever the ultimate solution, it is the opinion of this writer
that it needs to be found quickly. The Guatemala Protocol has
been in existence for four years without coming into effect. The
effect of this delay is amplified because none of the other partici-
pants intend to ratify unless the United States does.
No matter what the reason, however, continuing delay
weakens the chance of U.S. accession. For one thing, inflation and
a rising standard of living is again eating into the adequacy of the
limits. For another, there are those critics of the proposed system
who point to it as an unnecessary subsidy of international air
transportation at the expense of the air traveler. Further delay
serves only to add support to their view that the proposal is, in
essence, not only unfair but also unworkable. 137  Partial resolu-
tion of this problem was reached at the Diplomatic Conference
called by ICAO and held in September, 1975, and a formula was
agreed upon at this meeting which may give ratification of the
Guatemala Protocol a chance.
13 8
136. Pub. L. No. 93-110 (Sept. 21, 1973).
137. Three Views, note 71, supra.
138. The Montreal Diplomatic Conference sponsored by ICAO in September
of 1975 to revise the cargo provisions of the Warsaw Convention took up the
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This article introduces a whole new text into article 24 of the
Warsaw Convention. Paragraph 1 of the new article continues for
the carriage of cargo the existing rules of the original Warsaw
Convention with virtually no change in the language. However,
paragraph 2 dealing with the carriage of passengers is substantially
different from the old Warsaw Convention language. Most of the
changes are ones that arise out of the concern of the Conference
that the new limits should be limits that were absolutely unbreaka-
problem of a new international monetary unit to express the various limits of
liability set out in the Warsaw Convention. The solution adopted was to use as
the new monetary unit the Special Drawing Right (SDR) as defined by the 'Inter-
national Monetary Fund. The value of a particular national currency on the
date of judgment is to be calculated in accordance with the method of valuation
applied by the IMF in effect for its operations and transactions on that date. If
a particular State is not a member of the IMF, the calculation is to be determined
by that State. Further, if a State is not a member of IMF and it cannot under
its own law use the Special Drawing Right as a monetary unit, it will still be per-
mitted to use the monetary unit set out in the basic Guatemala Protocol in the
amount also set out in that Protocol. This unit remains a monetary unit corre-
sponding to 651/ milligrammes of gold of millesimal fineness nine hundred. See
generally Additional Protocol No. 3 to Amend the Convention for the Unification
of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air Signed at Warsaw on
12 October 1929 as amended by the Protocols Done at The Hague on 28 Septem-
ber 1955 and at Guatemala City on 8 March 1971, done at Montreal September
25, 1975, ICAO Doc. 9147 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Additional Protocol No. 31
[copy on file at CALIF. W. INT'L L.J.].
The basic limits of liability set out in article 22 of the Warsaw Convention as
amended by the Guatemala Protocol, and as further amended by the Protocol
adopted in Montreal in September of 1975 as expressed in Special Drawing Rights
are as follows:
article 22, paragraph 1 (a)-100,000 SDR's
article 22, paragraph l(b)- 4,150 SDR's
article 22, paragraph 1(c)- 1,000 SDR's
Further, the amounts expressed in article 42 of the Warsaw Convention as adopted
in the Guatemala Protocol are now expressed as 12,500 SDR's. Id. art. II.
As the IMF currently calculates the SDR, it has minor fluctuations in value.
However, these are not severe, and the limits expressed in terms of SDR's should
remain reasonably stable. For example, the U.S. dollar's value in terms of SDR's
has remained near a one-to-one ratio for some time, although recent quotations
show its value a little less than one-to-one (1 SDR - $1.15 to $1.20). As a
consequence, the basic limit of liability for death or injury of a passenger under
article 22, paragraph l(a) of the Warsaw Convention, as amended, expressed in
U.S. dollars dependent on the day of judgment would be somewhere in the range
of $115,000 to $120,000.
The solution is less than perfect, particularly since for some countries a
continuing reference to a monetary unit based upon gold is still possible, but, since
it is believed to be acceptable to the airlines of the world, it offers an opportunity
to get widespread application of a modernized system of tort compensation in
aviation cases. Therefore, it should be adopted.
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ble.189 However, in achieving this objective other changes have
occurred. In an effort to assure that the limits of the Convention
applied to all actions for damages, the Conference added new
language.
Under the old language (still applicable to the case of car-
riage of cargo) "any action for damages, however founded, can
only be brought subject to the conditions and limits set out in this
convention."' 40 Under the new text, this is substantially enlarged:
Any action for damages, however founded, whether under this
Convention, or in contract or in tort or otherwise, can only
be brought subject to the conditions and limits of liability set
out in this Convention .... 141
This language appears to have been intended to assure the air
carrier the benefit of the limits in all possible situations, including
the case of recourse actions discussed earlier. In addition, it
probably cures a defect that existed in the U.S. law.
In Noel v. Linea Aeropostal Venzolana,142 the court held, in a
case involving death in an international air transportation accident
to which the Warsaw Convention otherwise applied, that the War-
saw Convention did not create a cause of action. While this deci-
sion has been criticized as being based on a faulty interpretation of
the Warsaw Convention, 14 it has generally been regarded as ex-
pressing current U.S. law. Now, however, the specific reference to
actions "under this Convention" contained in the new language
may well change the rule of the Noel case. Certainly, the concern
that runs throughout the debates in the ICAO Legal Committee
and the Guatemala Conference that, particularly in the United
States, it was necessary to assure absolute unbreakability of the
limits, would support the view that the change was made to assure
that actions could be brought "under the Convention" contrary to
the Noel decision.
Another significant change from the original Warsaw provi-
sions is introduced by the last sentence of new article 24, para-
graph 2:
139. Changes were also made in article 25 of the Warsaw Convention as
amended by the Hague Protocol to achieve this goal, and they will be discussed
below. See also ICAO Doc. 9040-LC/167-1 (1972) at 135-45.
140. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, at 3020.
141. Guatemala Protocol, supra note 2, at 614.
142. 247 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 907 (1957).
143. Caulkins, The Cause of Action Under the Warsaw Convention, 26 J.
AnR L. & COM. 217 (1959).
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Such limits of liability constitute maximum limits and may not
be exceeded whatever the circumstances which gave rise to
the liability.1
44
As indicated, the Diplomatic Conference had decided to eliminate
proof of gross negligence as a circumstance permitting the limits to
be exceeded. To some delegates the fact of deletion of the excep-
tion without more, would have been sufficient to assure unbreaka-
bility. 145 However, to others mere deletion was not enough.'46 The
problem centered around the possibility that unless it was explicitly
forbidden, it was feared that a court in an exceptionally outrageous
case of negligence might, for public policy reasons, declare the
limit to be inapplicable. Thus, the new language quoted above was
introduced to assure that even in cases involving the most serious of
negligent acts the limits would be applied.
J. Article X
This article amends article 25 of the Warsaw Convention as
amended by the Hague Protocol to eliminate the provision that, in
the case of the carriage of passengers, permits the limits to be
broken upon proof "that the damage resulted from an act or
omission of the carrier, his servants or agents, done with intent to
cause damage or recklessly and with knowledge that damage would
probably result .... -17 This provision is continued, however, to
apply to the carriage of cargo since no substantive change was
made in that legal regime.
K. Article XI
This article makes only consequential changes to article 25A
which was added to the Warsaw Convention by the Hague Proto-
col. The article gives to servants and agents of the carrier the
protection of the limits of liability when acting within the scope of
their employment. Again, it is an effort to avoid any possibility of
breaking the liability limit by indirect actions against, for example,
a pilot. Such an action otherwise might not be subject to the limit,
and the carrier might ultimately have to pay by virtue of an
indemnification clause in a union contract. The change removes, in
144. Guatemala Protocol, supra note 2, at 614.
145. Remarks of Delegates of Spain and The Netherlands, ICAO Doc.
9040-LC/167-1 (1972) at 137, 141.
146. Remarks of Delegates of Italy, France and Jamaica, id. at 135, 136, 141.
147. Hague Protocol, supra note 9, at 383.
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the case of carriage of passengers, the old provision voiding the
limit in the case of gross negligence by such a servant or agent.
However, in the case of the carriage of cargo, that provision is
retained.
L. Article XII
The amendment made here is to add to article 28 of the
Warsaw Convention as a jurisdiction in which actions may be
brought, the jurisdiction in which the passenger has his domicile or
permanent residence, and in which the carrier "has an establish-
ment." As earlier stated, this was one of the amendments the
United States sought, and reflects its efforts to assure availability of
U.S. courts for U.S. citizens in almost all actions. However, in
accomplishing this objective, one possible problem was created
because the meaning of the word "establishment" is not entirely
clear.
There was a long and not very conclusive debate on the issue
at the Conference.141 The United States noted that in its own
"official" translation of the French version of the original Warsaw
Convention, it had always used the phrase "place of business," and
its willingness in this new clause to use the word "establishment"
arose from its understanding that the two phrases meant the same
thing.' 49 This view was based upon the fact that in the unamended
portion of article 28(1) where "place of business" is still the
"official" U.S. translation, the French text is "un 6stablissement ' '150
which is also the French text of the new clause.' 5 ' Consequently, it
must be assumed that the same sort of "presence" is contemplated
in both cases, and thus that the U.S. Delegation's remarks that no
new concept was intended are probably right. In any event, discus-
sion of this point during the ratification process might be useful in
giving U.S. courts some insight as to the intention of the govern-
ment.
M. Article XIII
This text introduces into the Warsaw Convention as article
30A, an express provision that the Convention shall not "prejudice
the question whether a person liable for damage in accordance with
148. ICAO Doe. 9040-LC/167-1 (1972) at 110-31.
149. Id. at 114, 119, 120.
150. 49 Stat. 3007 (1929).
151. ICAO Doe. 8932 (1971) at 3.
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its provisions has a right of recourse against any other person."'1 52
The basic reasons for the introduction of this new text are somewhat
obscure. The proposal originated with the Subcommittee of the
Legal Committee of ICAO and is recommended in its second
report.' Since there are no minutes of Subcommittee meetings, no
direct source of rationale exists, and the report of the Subcommit-
tee accompanying the text offers no reasons for its inclusion.' At
the meeting of the ICAO Legal Committee, the Committee accept-
ed the recommendation of the Subcommittee without vote and with
little substantive discussion. 15  However, in its report, the Commit-
tee indicated it considered such a provision necessary because
under a regime of absolute liability, a carrier might be liable for the
negligent acts of third parties, and thus, the Convention should
contain an express statement that any right of recourse which
might exist would remain unaffected.15 6 Why it was thought that
the Convention might otherwise extinguish such a right is not
disclosed.
At the Diplomatic Conference in Guatemala there is an equal-
ly brief discussion of the new article, ending again with little
further clarification in adoption of the text coming from the Legal
Committe.1' 7 Thus, there is little rationale to explain this new
article, and since it is probably only a declaration of what the law
would be otherwise, none may be needed.
N. Article XIV
This article brings into the Warsaw Convention article 35A,
which is probably the most controversial of the provisions that the
United States proposed and ultimately succeeded in having adopt-
ed. This new article explicitly recognizes the right of any Contract-
ing State to establish and operate within its territory a system to
supplement the compensation payable to claimants under the Con-
vention. As earlier indicated, the United States entered into the
negotiation of a revised Warsaw Convention with the object of
securing "sufficiency of recovery" as one of its primary goals. At
that time, based on data then available, $100,000 was considered
152. Guatemala Protocol, supra note 2, at 615.
153. ICAO Doe. 8839-LC/158-1 (1969) at 12.
154. Id. at 4.
155. ICAO Doc. 8878-LC/162 (1970) at 227-28.
156. Id. at 26.
157. ICAO Doc. 9040-LC/167-1 (1972) at 197-98.
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the basic minimum which could be accepted.1 58 In fact, this contin-
ued to be the basis of the United States position throughout the
discussions of the matter in the ICAO Legal Committee. However,
after the end of those meetings in early 1970, the United States
undertook a new survey of recoveries in U.S. domestic aviation
accident cases to determine if the goal of "sufficiency of recovery"
could still be achieved at $100,000.
This new survey disclosed major increases in the amounts of
recoveries. These increases were unanticipated, not only by the
United States but also by the other countries whose air carriers
served the United States. For example, the new figures indicated
that in the first half of 1970, over 58% of the recoveries within the
United States in non-Warsaw aviation accidents were in excess of
$150,000 as contrasted to the earlier figures where, in 1966, only
18.3% were at or over $150,000. In fact, to assure full recovery
for 80% of the cases in the first half of 1970, limits on the order of
$300,000 to $350,000 would be required. The average level of
recovery in a domestic accident case in the United States had more
than doubled, jumping from less than $90,000 before 1968 to
nearly $200,000 by the first half of 1970.
These figures made it plain that $100,000 was no longer
adequate for U.S. citizens. The United States informed ICAO of
this fact, stating that it was examining ways to make adequate
provision for its citizens but did not have specific proposals to
make at that time. The figures on which the concern of the United
States was based were submitted with this statement and are part of
the record of the Guatemala Conference.' 59
The same IGIA Committee that had worked on the position
of the U.S. government for the ICAO Legal Committee meeting
took up this new problem. Its solution was to propose a supple-
mentary compensation system which any Contracting State could
establish for the benefit of its citizens. No specific proposal was
made in advance documentation on the realization that such a
proposal, coming just before the convening of the Diplomatic
Conference and after most ICAO countries believed the United
States had accepted the $100,000 limit of the Legal Committee
text, would give rise to serious problems of negotiation. Neverthe-
less, some basic principles of such a system were agreed upon and
158. See authorities cited in notes 50-53, supra.
159. ICAO Doc. 9040-LC/167-2 (1972) at 43-57.
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most found their expression in a working paper filed by the United
States at the Guatemala Conference.'
Basically, these principles were that any such supplement
should be paid for by those who would benefit; that it would apply
to all citizens and residents equally; that no competitive advantage
or disadvantage would be created for any carrier; that rights to
recover from the supplementary system would be the same as the
right to recover from the carrier; and that funding would be from
passenger collections made within the country creating the system.
It expressed the strongly held view of the United States that the
treaty itself while recognizing such systems should not try to spell
out the details or the amounts. 1"' As indicated in its initial state-
ment on the matter, the United States had not decided how to
establish such a supplementary system and did not want the treaty
to foreclose its options.
As could be expected, the introduction of this proposal
produced a host of unfavorable comments. 62 However, in the end
two separate working groups produced article 35A which was
accepted.' 63  With one or two exceptions, the U.S. views as to
the provisions which should be in the treaty on this point prevailed.
The essential points now in article 35A are:
1. The Convention recognizes the right of a State to estab-
lish and operate "within its territory a system to supple-
ment the compensation payable to claimants under the
Convention. . ....
2. The system is not to "impose upon the carrier, his servants
or agents, any liability in addition to that provided under
[the] Convention."
3. It is not to "impose upon the carrier any financial or
administrative burdens other than collecting in that State
contributions from passengers if required to do so."
4. "It shall not give rise to any discrimination between car-
riers ... and the benefits available to the said passengers
.. . shall be extended to them regardless of the carrier
whose services they have used;" and
5. Any passenger, or any person claiming through him, who
160. ICAO Doe. 9040-LC/167-2 (1972) at 76.
161. Id.
162. Minutes, ICAO Doe. 9040-LC/167-1 (1972) at 65-90.
163. For a history of these negotiations, see FORUM, note 71, supra.
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"has contributed to the system.., shall be entitled to the
benefits of the system.'
1 64
There are one or two points about the foregoing that deserve
comment. First, the United States at all times was very careful to
insist upon language which gave great flexibility in the manner in
which the system would be set up, specifically rejecting one version
which would have required that the system be operated only by the
government pursuant to specific legislation. 16 5 Secondly, and in
consonance with its efforts to keep the system flexible, the United
States was careful to leave open the option of voluntary agreement
by the carriers to do more than could be "imposed" on them by
legislation.
The government has opted for a plan patterned on the lines of
the Montreal Agreement calling for an agreement between the air
carriers serving the United States and a contractor who will admin-
ister funds collected on international tickets sold within the United
States and from which supplemental benefits up to $200,000
per passenger will be paid, thus effecting a maximum potential
recovery of $320,000.166 Any such plan, of course, is subject to the
approval of the Civil Aeronautics Board1 67 and is also subject
through that agency to continuing review by the government.
Such a system has been successfully developed. After extensive
consideration of a number of proposals from a wide variety of
organizations and individuals, an agreement between the airlines
and the Prudential Insurance Company as contractor has been
reached.
168
This plan meets essential criteria set out by the government by
providing $200,000 supplemental coverage, initially for $2.00 per
international ticket, and provides that 90% of receipts are avail-
able for payment and administration of claims. It also assures re-
covery from the fund for provable damages in excess of the liability
of the carrier on the same basis as the basic liability of the carrier.
Regrettably, the problems attendant upon the expression of the
limit of liability of the carrier in terms of gold brought this
164. Guatemala Protocol, supra note 2, at 615.
165. Remarks of United States Delegate, ICAO Doc. 9040-LC/167-1 (1972)
at 148.
166. See FORUM; Three Views, note 71, supra.
167. See 49 U.S.C. § 1382 (1970).
168. See Agreement to Establish Supplemental Compensation Plan Pursuant
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progress to a virtual halt for several months. So long as the gold
problem discussed above remained unresolved, the carriers were
unwilling to sign the agreement for a supplemental compensation
system, and in fact, as noted, may not support ratification of the
Guatemala Protocol. 16 9 However, with the successful conclusion of
the 1975 Conference in Montreal, 170 the carriers signed and filed
with the Civil Aeronautics Board on December 31, 1975 an
agreement with the Prudential Insurance Company providing for
supplemental compensation under article 35A of the Warsaw Con-
vention as amended by the Guatemala Protocol.' 71 Should the gold
problem be completely resolved, quick action on the agreement will
be possible.
0. Article XV
This article introduces into the Warsaw Convention the last of
the new provisions which the United States considered necessary to
construct a new and viable treaty. New article 42 provides that on
the fifth and tenth years after the Guatemala Protocol comes into
force there will be "Conferences of the Parties" to review the limit
in paragraph l(a) of article 22. Unless these Conferences decide
otherwise by a two-thirds majority vote, the limit in paragraph
l(a) of article 22 shall be increased by 187,500 francs, roughly
$12,000 at the current "official" U.S. rate for gold of $42.22 an
ounce.
Hopefully, the effect of this will be to prevent obsolescence of
the Guatemla Protocol through inflationary erosion of the real
value of the liability limit and accommodation of rising world-wide
standards of living. Admittedly, at a rate of increase of only a little
over 2% per annum, this seems doubtful. More hope for achieving
its intended objective would be possible if article 42 did not contain
paragraph 2 which was inserted in an excess of caution by dele-
gates opposing higher limits.
Under paragraph 2 the Conferences are not to increase the
limit by more than the 187,500 francs. In the opinion of the
author, this, while probably politically effective, is legally ineffec-
tive. All of article 42 is made subject to article 41 of original
Warsaw Convention which provides a mechanism for Diplomatic
Conference "to consider any improvements which may be made in
169. Statement of Air Transport Association of America; Statement of Inter-
national Air Transport Association note 128, supra.
170. See note 138, supra.
171. See note 168, supra.
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this convention,"'172 and this is subject to no restriction on changes
which may be made. Thus, if a five-year increase of 187,500 francs
is obviously too small to prevent obsolescence of the Convention, a
Conference can be called under article 41 instead of article 42 to
remedy the situation.
P. Article XVI
At least initially, it is expected that there will be some diver-
gence between those countries signing the Guatemala Protocol and
those countries who are party to the original Warsaw Convention
as amended by the Hague Protocol. Additionally, there may be
countries party to the original Warsaw, unamended by the Hague
Protcol, who are not party to the Gatemala Protocol. For that
reason it is necessary to separately provide for the application by
States of the Warsaw Convention as amended by the Guatemala
Protocol, to particular types of international journeys. This article
does not amend any existing article of Warsaw because it relates
only to application of the Guatemala Protocol, but uses, as between
signatory States, the identical standard as that of article 1 of the
original Warsaw Convention in determining to what "international
carriage" this Protocol will apply.
Q. Articles XVII Through XXVI
These are the so-called "final clauses" of the Guatemala
Protocol, none of which are amendments to the Warsaw Conven-
tion. All of them relate solely to the Guatemala Protocol and deal
with such matters as who may sign, effect of ratification, entry into
force, method of accession, method of denunication and nature of
reservations. Of these, the one of principal importance at this time
is article XX governing entry into force.
As earlier mentioned, most States present at the Diplomatic
Conference made it very clear that the increase in the amounts of
the limit contained in the Protocol was higher than they would
agree to were it not for the insistence of the United States. For
that reason, they wished to make sure that the Protocol could not
come into effect unless the United States was a Party. This article
achieved this objective by two provisions. First, the Protocol would
come into effect ninety days after thirty states had ratified, but
second, only if, of those states, the airlines of five carry "at least
172. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, at 3023.
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40% of the total internationally scheduled air traffic of the airlines
of the member States of the International Civil Aviation Organiza-
tion . . .""' for the year 1970. However, Additional Protocol
No. 3174 to the Warsaw Convention adopted at the Diplomatic
Conference in Montreal in September, 1975, modified this provi-
sion so that the Guatemala Protocol as amended by Additional
Protocol No. 3 will come into effect as soon as thirty signatory
states have deposited their instruments of ratification.
175
III. CONCLUSIONS
The Warsaw Convention is an interesting anomaly. It is a
complex and somewhat anachronistic document. It has been
patched up and preserved despite its obvious defects by the efforts
of governments and airlines. It has been severely criticized by
courts,' 70 practitioners,' 77 and writers. 17  Nevertheless, it has, so
far, survived both the rather cumbersome repairs and the com-
ments of its critics. In fact, strong efforts are underway for its
further rehabilitation through the Guatemala Protocol. It is not
easy to say why.
Obviously, international air transportation is today a major
industry. Over 10,000,000 people leave this country annually for a
foreign destination. While the United States is the largest single
contributor to the world's international air passenger total, the air
traffic of other countries brings the world total of international
airline passengers, for 1973, to 96,000,000.17 Passenger traffic of
this magnitude requires some form of international legal stability so
that the respective rights and obligations of passengers and air
carriers are reasonably definite and certain at all times and not
subject to changing local laws applied in various degrees by the
widely varying views of the courts of the world. Thus, it can be
argued that the Warsaw Convention has survived because circum-
stances require its existence. However, contrary to what one might
173. Guatemala Protocol, supra note 2, at 616.
174. See note 138, supra.
175. Additional Protocol No. 3., supra note 138, art. VIII.
176. See, e.g., Burdell v. Canadian Pacific Airways, Ltd., 10 Av. L. REP.
18,151 (Cir. Ct. Cook Co., I11. 1968); 11 Av. L. REP. 17,351 (Cir. Ct. Cook
Co., Ill. 1969).
177. See, e.g., Three Views, supra note 71, at 131.
178. See, e.g., Lowenfeld, note 3, supra.
179. 2 ICAO Digest of Statistics No. 189-B, (Airline Traffic) 1969-1973,
(1974) at A-2.
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expect considering the large amount of international passenger
traffic, the number of litigated cases, and the volume of law review
articles and comments, the fact is that the number of cases of
deaths and injuries to U.S. air passengers to which the Convention
might conceivably apply, is not large.180
Why then is there substantial expenditure of time and effort
by governments, airlines, international organizations and others on
a treaty that has a fairly low incidence of application? One reason,
already cited, is the need for uniformity of law in an industry that
by its very nature is exposed to diversity of law. Another is the ob-
vious interest of the air carriers in protecting themselves from major
losses through unlimited verdicts. A third, and not minimal reason,
is that this treaty is widely adhered to and is referred to as a prime
example of international cooperation which should be preserved.""'
Probably the first and last reasons, coupled with a strong desire to
try for a fresh approach to the problem of compensation to victims
of international aviation accidents, are the fundamental reasons why
180. In preparation for its work in developing supplemental compensation
system under article 35A, the IGIA Ad Hoc Working Group on Warsaw/Guate-
mala obtained information from the Department of State on the number of deaths
of U.S. citizens occurring outside the United States resulting from aviation acci-
dents. This data was compiled from reports required of each U.S. consulate
involving deaths of U.S. citizens occurring within its jurisdiction. Admittedly,
these figures may not be absolutely accurate due to errors in reporting or in locat-
ing the reports. Nevertheless, they are revealing as to the approximate numbers
of U.S. citizens that may be involved in future applications of the revised Warsaw
Convention.
By year, U.S. citizen fatalities in aviation accidents outside the United States,
according to this source were:
Year Number Year Number
1966 155 1970 145
1967 27 1971 12
1968 27 1972 72
1969 67 1973 100 Total fatalities: 565
The foregoing are gross figures and there is no way to determine how many were
the result of accidents involving a journey to which the Warsaw Convention might
apply. In fact, some were fatalities occurring in non-commercial flights by small
aircraft, not covered by the Convention; some fatalities listed were crew members,
not covered in any case by Warsaw; and some were on purely domestic flights
within a foreign country to which it is unlikely that Warsaw rules applied. Thus,
even of the relatively small total of 565, a substantial number were non-Warsaw
cases and should be excluded. For comparison, the total number of claims within
the United States, both Warsaw and non-Warsaw, arising out of aviation accidents
for the period 1960 to 1969 was 2,469, of which 2,356 were death claims. ICAO
Doc. 9040-LC/167-2 (1972) at 56.
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the U.S. government has spent so much time and effort on this
treaty.
Certainly, the Guatemala Protocol is a new approach to tort
compensation. It gives the potential claimant not only absolute
liability but also deprives the carrier of all defenses except contrib-
utory negligence. With today's distressing high incidence of vio-
lence, the extension of absolute liability to include hijacking, sabo-
tage and acts of war is of major importance to the traveling public.
The Protocol also does much to minimize litigation; absolute lia-
bility removes proof of fault as an issue. The revised clause au-
thorizing awards of attorneys' fees and other litigation expenses,
over and above the limit, encourages settlements. In fact, the only
issue left for controversy is the amount of damages, and this issue,
unlike proof of fault in an aviation accident, does not necessarily
require an aviation law expert. Hopefully, the result is that more of
the proceeds recovered go to the claimant and get there quicker
than is the case under the common law tort compensation system.
If this occurs, then recoveries, even ones reduced by the operation
of the liability limit ($120,000 plus $200,000), will provide the
sufficiency of recovery that the United States set out to achieve in
the years 1968 to 1969.182
At any rate, it is the view of this writer that the legal system
which the Guatemala Protocol will create is worth the time and the
effort it has cost. Aviation litigation has a reputation of being
difficult, time consuming and expensive. Possibly this new system
will be a start toward a better way of handling an increasingly
serious problem of providing adequate recovery for the victim,
without undue burdens on the carrier. This, plus the need for
uniformity of law and continued international cooperation to that
end warrant the continuing efforts to preserve the Warsaw Conven-
tion.
182. Three Views, supra note 71, at 141-44.
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